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I   INTRODUCTION 
[P]urposive construction to ascertain whether a statute extinguishes native title 
rights or interests is not without difficulty where the statute was enacted prior to 
this Court’s decision in Mabo [No 2] that the common law could recognise native 
title. P1048F1 
Native title jurisprudence is derived from the common law.P1049F2 P The concept of 
native title and its re-institutionalisation into the underlying land law framework 
emanates from the conclusions of the High Court of Australia in Mabo [No 2].P1050F3 P 
This decision revised the architecture of the ownership framework underpinning 
Australian land law. The Court allowed native title rights and interests to be 
recognised in circumstances where they could be shown to have survived the 
impact of colonisation and the assertion of sovereignty by the United Kingdom. P1051F4 P 
The conceptualisation of native title was given statutory validation in the Native 
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1  Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, 229–30 [31] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
2  The origins of native title were outlined in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 51 (‘Mabo [No 
2])’ by Brennan J who stated:  
Where a proprietary title capable of recognition by the common law is found to have been possessed by a 
community in occupation of a territory, there is no reason why that title should not be recognized as a 
burden on the Crown’s radical title when the Crown acquires sovereignty over that territory. The fact that 
individual members of the community … enjoy only usufructuary rights that are not proprietary in nature 
is no impediment to the recognition of a proprietary community title. 
  See also Kent McNeil, ‘The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the Existence and Content of 
Native Title at Common Law’ in Kent McNeil (ed), Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in 
Canada and Australia (Native Law Centre, 2001) 416, 420–1. 
3  (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
4  See Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 29–30, where Brennan J concluded that Australian common law is 
an ‘organic development’ of the law of England and that it might legitimately develop ‘independently of 
English precedent’ and in so doing, overrule a ‘postulated rule of the common law’ if it seriously offends 
the contemporary values which are the aspirations of the Australian legal system. 
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Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’), which outlined the mandatory requirements for 
establishing native title rights and interests.P1052F5P The statutory validation of native 
title gave it a strong legislative foundation, and prompted the High Court to reify 
native title as a statutory rather than a common law concept.P1053F6 
One of the most distinct and enduring characteristics of native title rights and 
interests in Australia is their susceptibility to extinguishment.P1054F7 P The scope and 
range of the doctrine of extinguishment is sweeping. Native title rights and 
interests may be extinguished by the exercise of an inconsistent grant of 
sovereign power, whether the inconsistency is express or implied and whether it 
is manifest through the issuance of a specific grant or through legislative acts.P1055F8 P 
Determining whether an exercise of sovereign power is consistent with the 
recognition of native title rights and interests is therefore the operational fulcrum 
underpinning the extinguishment process.P1056F9 
In this article, the scope and application of the statutory construction 
assessment that underlies the consistency evaluation is examined. The focus is 
upon legislation enacted prior to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
(‘RDA’) and the NTA because these Acts do not attract the NTA validation 
provisions and therefore must be assessed in accordance with common law 
processes. The primary contention of this article is that the interpretative strategy 
for determining the legislative intent of Acts predating the RDA and the NTA 
                                                 
5  The definition of native title is encapsulated within the NTA s 223(1). See also Lisa Strelein, 
‘Conceptualising Native Title’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 95. Strelein notes that the ‘Mabo decision 
did not exhaustively define the scope and nature of native title, nor would the High Court have intended it 
to do so’: at 96. 
6  See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 440 [32], where 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ concluded that native title is now a ‘creature of that Act [the NTA], 
not the common law’. See also Noel Pearson, ‘Concept of Native Title at Common Law’ in Land Rights – 
Past, Present and Future: 20 Years of Land Rights: Our Land Is Our Life: Conference Papers (Northern 
Land Council, 1996) 118, 119; Strelein, above n 5, 123–4. 
7  This is outlined by Toohey J in Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 195: ‘Where the legislation reveals a 
clear and plain intention to extinguish traditional title, it is effective to do so’. 
8  See Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 69, where Brennan J stated:  
Where the Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest that is wholly or partially inconsistent 
with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. 
Thus native title has been extinguished by grants of freehold or of leases but not necessarily by the grant 
of lesser interests (eg authorities to prospect for minerals). 
  In Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 422 (‘Native Title Act Case’), Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that the intention of the Crown to extinguish may 
‘be ascertainable from the instruments relevant to the establishment of the Colony considered in the 
context of the surrounding circumstances’. Their Honours noted, however, that ‘the mere formation of an 
intention by the officers of the Crown could not have achieved the extinguishment of native title; 
intention would have had to find expression in order to be effective’. 
9  See Kristin Howden, ‘Common Law Doctrine of Extinguishment: More than a Pragmatic Compromise’ 
(2001) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 206, 211. Howden notes that the test of inconsistency ‘forms 
the basis of the doctrine of extinguishment. As such, the test tells us that the Crown can appropriate land 
or grant it to third parties without having to deal with the burden of native title’. 
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needs to be broadly purposive rather than textualist in orientation to ensure that a 
range of relevant inter-contextual factors and policies are properly considered. A 
purposive approach to statutory construction provides a more effective 
foundation for courts in evaluating the underlying objectives connected with the 
implementation of native title rights and interests. This is despite the fact that 
their recognition postdates the implementation of the Act under consideration in 
a particular case.P1057F10 
A number of High Court decisions in this area suggest that a purposive 
approach to statutory construction is increasingly favoured. In Yanner v Eaton,P1058F11 P 
Akiba v Commonwealth,P1059F12P and Karpany v Dietman,P1060F13P the breadth of focus given 
to the characterisation of the relevant state and federal fisheries legislation 
ultimately averted the extinguishment of native title rights and interests to hunt 
and fish. These decisions suggest that a wide-ranging purposive approach to 
legislative intent is desirable when assessing whether pre-RDA and NTA Acts 
should be deemed to have extinguished usufructuary native title rights. This 
approach to statutory construction is better equipped to take account of a statute’s 
broad policy context; to address unenumerated historical, social and political 
concerns; and to balance the normative commitment of judges to faithfully 
ascertain legislative intention with the broader normative commitments to uphold 
                                                 
10  There are three broad approaches to statutory interpretation: purposivism, textualism and intentionalism. 
For a discussion of these approaches, see generally William N Eskridge Jr, Philip P Frickey and Elizabeth 
Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (Foundation Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 219 ff. See also D C 
Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis, 8th ed, 2014); William N 
Eskridge Jr, Philip P Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the 
Creation of Public Policy (Thomson West, 4th ed, 2007). Unlike textualism, which posits that a statute’s 
original and ‘plain’ meaning, as evidenced in its text, should govern statutory interpretation, or 
intentionalism, which presupposes that there is a defensible legislative intent underlying the statute, 
which a court should ascertain, largely by reference to the legislative text, a purposive approach 
authorises courts to go beyond the defined words or intent articulated within a statute to reach an 
interpretation that is consistent with the purpose for which the statute was enacted. A purposive approach 
allows courts to utilise extraneous materials in order to ascertain the purpose of the statute. Purposivism 
assumes that every statute is a purposive act of the legislators who are seeking a particular outcome. 
However, it also assumes that the legislature had probably not anticipated the details of a particular case. 
See also Frank B Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation (Stanford University Press, 
2009) 60–1; Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Sari Bashi trans, Princeton University 
Press, 2005) [trans of: Parshanut Takhlitit Be-mishpaṭ (first published 2005)]. 
11  (1999) 201 CLR 351 (‘Yanner’). 
12  (2013) 250 CLR 209 (‘Akiba’). 
13  (2013) 303 ALR 216 (‘Karpany’). 
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the recognition and protection of native title rights and interests within 
Australia.P1061F14 
This article is divided into three parts. Part II examines the operative 
dimensions of the common law doctrine of extinguishment, the relevance and 
scope of the RDA, and the validation and extinguishment principles that inform 
the NTA process. It goes on to examine the suitability of textualist and purposive 
interpretation methodologies for common law extinguishment processes and to 
consider how the section 211 defence in the NTA may provide constructive 
guidance. This Part argues that in order to achieve greater parity between 
common law and statutory extinguishment processes, the common law 
assessment of pre-RDA and NTA legislation needs to be flexible enough to take 
account of the provisions of the NTA. In particular, provisions such as section 
211 are important given the insight they provide regarding NTA policy on the 
scope and extent of permissible regulatory incursion into native title rights and 
interests. A liberal, purposive approach to statutory interpretation facilitates the 
integration of core NTA policy directives into the extinguishment determination, 
resulting in a fairer and more effective outcome. 
Part III goes on to examine three significant High Court decisions in this area 
noted above: Yanner, Akiba, and Karpany. Each of these decisions held that 
native title rights and interests were not extinguished by Acts predating the RDA 
and NTA in issue because the statutory interpretation process resulted in the 
relevant Acts being characterised as regulatory and therefore not inconsistent 
with the continued recognition of native title rights and interests. The 
interpretative strategies underlying the assessments are reviewed and the 
relevance of section 211 of the NTA is examined. This Part argues that the 
preference of the High Court for a broader, purposive interpretative strategy has 
decreased the extinguishment outcomes, and in so doing, moderated the 
destructive potential of the common law in such cases. 
Part IV then considers the evolving jurisprudence of Canadian reconciliation 
law and how it has altered the interface between regulation and Aboriginal title. 
Particular emphasis is given to section 35(1) of the Canada Act 1982 (UK) clause 
11, schedule B (‘Constitution Act 1982’), which provides protection for 
Aboriginal rights. The promulgation of a constitutional theory of reconciliation 
has helped to shield Aboriginal title in Canada from invasive regulatory 
                                                 
14  See Kent McNeil, ‘Indigenous Rights Litigation, Legal History and the Role of Experts’ (2014) 77 
Saskatchewan Law Review 173, 201. McNeil notes that ‘[j]udges have to make decisions based on the 
force of law as a normative system of principles and rules, not on law as an evidential matter of historical 
fact’. For a discussion of the importance of purposivism within United States jurisprudence, see John F 
Manning, ‘The New Purposivism’ [2011] Supreme Court Review 113 and M Herz, ‘Purposivism and 
Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation’ (2009) Michigan State Law Review 89, 98, where 
the author examines some of the difficulties associated with determining purpose. More generally, see 
Frank B Cross, ‘The Significance of Statutory Interpretative Methodologies’ (2007) 82 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1971.  
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incursions. The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v British Columbia clearly illustrates the progression of this theory.P1062F15P This 
Part argues that in the absence of constitutional protection, Australian courts 
should take full advantage of the constructional tools they have before them to 
improve the protective framework for native title and reduce the prospect of an 
unfair and arbitrary common law extinguishment process. 
 
II   THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF EXTINGUISHMENT 
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NTA 
A   Extinguishment by Inconsistent Grant and Necessary Implication 
The extinguishment principle is an incontrovertible aspect of the British 
constitutional framework.P1063F16P This elemental concept informs both the recognition 
and the durability of native title. Recognised native title rights and interests may 
only be exercised where they have not already been extinguished and interests 
that have been acknowledged remain susceptible to extinguishment. The end 
point for the common law doctrine of extinguishment is the legal cessation of 
native title rights and interests. In the words of French CJ and Crennan J in 
Akiba, extinguishment amounts to the ‘obverse of recognition’.P1064F17 
Extinguishment is, of course, a highly juridical concept in that it defines a 
purely legal state of affairs. Where extinguishment occurs, Aboriginal people are 
legally precluded from exercising traditional rights such as hunting or fishing 
within a prescribed area. Extinguishment does not and should not deny the social 
foundation of Aboriginal laws and customs. Hence, it must be borne in mind that, 
as noted by the High Court in Yanner, 
[r]egulating particular aspects of the usufructuary relationship with traditional land 
does not sever the connection of the Aboriginal peoples concerned with the land 
… and does not deny the continued exercise of the rights and interests that 
Aboriginal law and custom recognises them as possessing. P1065F18 
Legal extinguishment refers to a termination of native title rights and 
interests flowing from the implementation of an inconsistent legislative or 
                                                 
15  [2014] 2 SCR 256 (‘Tsilhqot’in’). 
16  For discussion on the common law doctrine of extinguishment, see generally Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘“Clear 
and Plain Intention”: Extinguishment of Native Title in Australia and Canada Post-Wik’ (1997) 6 Griffith 
Law Review 6; Maureen Tehan, ‘A Hope Disillusioned, an Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common 
Law Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 
523. For discussion on the virtues of constitutional protection and recognition, see generally Megan Davis 
and Zrinka Lemezina, ‘Indigenous Australians and the Preamble: Towards a More Inclusive Constitution 
or Entrenching Marginalisation?’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 239. 
17  (2013) 250 CLR 209, 219 [10]. 
18  (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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executive act.P1066F19 P As outlined by the High Court in Western Australia v Ward, 
extinguishment describes ‘the consequences in law of acts attributed to the 
legislative or executive branches of government’.P1067F 20 P Such acts may constitute 
either a grant of a right to a third party, or may refer to powers exercised over the 
land which are deemed to be inconsistent with the continued existence of native 
title rights and interests. 
Hence, the extinguishment principle has a twofold operation. Native title 
rights and interests may become defeasible through either (i) a lawful legislative 
or executive exercise of the power to grant interests in land inconsistent with the 
continued rights of Indigenous people to enjoy native title; or (ii) a lawful 
exercise of legislative or executive power in the form of a legislative provision or 
framework which is interpreted to be inconsistent with native title rights and 
interests.P1068F21 
Extinguishment by necessary implication has a fundamentally different focus 
to extinguishment by inconsistent grant. An extinguishment arising from the 
issuance of an inconsistent grant is grounded in an objective and comparative 
evaluation of conferred rights.P1069F 22 P It is not possible for an extinguishment by 
inconsistent grant to occur ‘by degrees of inconsistency of rights’ because the 
process is absolute.P1070F23P Hence, one right will necessarily imply the non-existence of 
the other when there is ‘logical antimony’ between each.P1071F24P Traditional native title 
rights and interests must be able to function consistently with the rights attached 
to the Crown grant in order to avoid extinguishment in this context. 
An extinguishment arising from necessary implication is far more expansive 
as it is a product of statutory construction.P1072F 25 P Extinguishment by implication 
occurs where it is determined that Parliament intended, through a clear and plain 
exercise of sovereign power, to extinguish native title rights and interests.P1073F26 P This 
type of extinguishment is not based upon an objective conferral of rights, but 
rather upon a construction of the intended scope and effect of the legislative 
                                                 
19  For a deconstructed outline of the consequences of the doctrine of extinguishment, see Brian Slattery, 
‘The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights’ (2007) 38 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 595. The 
author discusses the particular amenability of Aboriginal rights to ‘cessation’.  
20  (2002) 213 CLR 1, 69 [26] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) (‘Ward’). 
21  See Native Title Act Case (1995) 183 CLR 373, 418 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ). 
22  See Banjima People v Western Australia [No 2] (2013) 305 ALR 1, 141–2 [856] (Barker J). His Honour 
noted that the inquiry is an objective one, which ‘requires identification of and comparison between two 
sets of rights, sometimes called the inconsistency of incidents test’. 
23  Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 91 [82] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
24  Western Australia v Brown (2014) 306 ALR 168, 176 [38] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane 
JJ). 
25  See Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 73–6 (Brennan J), on the scope of extinguishment arising from 
statutory construction. See also Howden, above n 9. 
26  See A-G (Canada) v Hallet & Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427, 450 (Lord Radcliffe). His Lordship said that 
‘there is a well-known general principle that statutes which encroach upon the rights of the subject, 
whether as regards person or property, are subject to a “strict” construction’. 
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framework as a whole. Where legislation is enacted prior to the recognition of 
native title, courts are required to ascertain whether Parliament intended the Act 
to operate alongside native title or whether the legislative framework should be 
interpreted to preclude this.P1074F27 
An implied extinguishment that seeks to make a counterfactual assessment of 
what Parliament might have intended, if native title interests were recognised at 
the point when the Act was implemented, is challenging. Courts are required to 
determine how the Act intended to deal with interests, the scope and nature of 
which were unknown at the date when the legislation was introduced. The 
statutory construction process that underlies this type of assessment is amenable 
to arbitrary and unstructured interpretative suppositions. Assumptions may be 
made about the legislative focus of an Act that may be unjustified by its intended 
normative significance.P1075F28P The High Court in Akiba held that an extinguishment 
assessment in this context requires the court to identify and compare the 
legislative focus of the Act with the rights and interests that underpin native title 
but acknowledged that this type of diagnostic evaluation is ‘not without 
difficulty’.P1076F29 
The prevailing methodology has been to bifurcate the possible 
characterisations of the legislative framework as either prohibitive (and therefore 
inconsistent with native title) or regulatory (and therefore not inconsistent with 
native title). In each instance, the justifications and interpretative strategies 
employed to determine which characterisation the legislation in issue should be 
given varies in scope and form. The High Court has increasingly displayed a 
strong tendency, in making this determination, to take account of the provisions 
and objectives of the NTA. The aim of the Court in doing so is to develop an 
improved understanding not only of the nature of usufructuary rights and 
interests, but more fundamentally, how those interests may function effectively 
alongside regulatory frameworks.P1077F30 
 
B   The Legitimacy of the Doctrine of Extinguishment 
The capacity of the legislature to terminate a property right is not peculiar to 
native title jurisprudence. It is, however, fundamental to the common law that a 
subject should not be deprived of property without a legal right to compensation, 
                                                 
27  Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 89 [78] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), citing Wik Peoples v 
Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 168–9 (Gummow J); Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, 126 
[43] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (‘Fejo’). 
28  See especially Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21 Public 
Law Review 239, 252. Brennan notes that: 
reluctance to find textual ambiguity, or to invoke a statutory purpose conceived in general terms, risks 
emptying the prefatory words chosen by Parliament of their intended normative significance – let alone 
missing a more broadly conceived notion of purpose derived from extrinsic material. 
29  (2013) 250 CLR 209, 229–31 [31]–[35] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
30  See Part III of this article for discussion of the conclusions of the Court in Yanner, Akiba, and Karpany. 
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in the absence of a clear and unequivocal legislative intention.P1078F31P This was clearly 
outlined by Griffith CJ and Rich J in Commonwealth v Hazeldell Ltd, who stated 
that ‘[i]t is a settled rule of construction that such an intention cannot be imputed 
to the Legislature unless expressed in unequivocal terms incapable of any other 
meaning’.P1079F32P This rule of statutory interpretation is a component of a more general 
presumption against legislative interference with vested rights, including rights to 
property.P1080F33 
Legislative and executive extinguishment flows directly from the fact that the 
British constitution does not incorporate any protection against an interference 
with rights.P1081F34P Within an inherited feudal framework, the Crown is the ultimate 
owner and has the capacity to exercise full sovereign power over land.P1082F35 P The 
specific amenability of native title to legislative or executive extinguishment is a 
consequence of its expression within the tenure framework in Australia. The 
decision in Mabo [No 2] articulated native title as an encumbrance on the pre-
existing radical title of the Crown and this meant that Indigenous holders did  
not retain independent, allodial ownership.P1083F36 P The combination of the Crown’s 
underlying radical title and its enduring sovereignty of power equipped the 
legislature with the formal capacity to issue grants or enact legislation 
inconsistent with the continuing recognition of native title rights and interests. In 
                                                 
31  For a recent restatement of this principle, see The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition 
Tribunal (2012) 246 CLR 379, 443 [172] (Heydon J). See also Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 111 
(Deane and Gaudron JJ); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 207 [175] 
(Heydon J).  
32  (1918) 25 CLR 552, 563.  
33  See Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v Cannon Brewery Co Ltd [1919] AC 744, 752 (Lord 
Atkinson). 
34  See T R S Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ (1985) 
44 Cambridge Law Journal 111. 
35  See Theodore F T Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Butterworth, 5th ed, 1956) 506–20 
for an outline of feudalism and sovereignty. Following the conclusions of the High Court in Mabo [No 2], 
the Crown retains full sovereignty of power but sovereignty of ownership is now qualified and, where a 
native title encumbrance can be established, the Crown retains a radical title which may be burdened by 
native title. See also Samantha Hepburn, ‘Feudal Tenure and Native Title: Revising an Enduring Fiction’ 
(2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 49. 
36  (1992) 175 CLR 1, 48 (Brennan J). His Honour stated that:  
By attributing to the Crown a radical title to all land within a territory over which the Crown has assumed 
sovereignty, the common law enabled the Crown, in exercise of its sovereign power, to grant an interest in 
land to be held of the Crown or to acquire land for the Crown’s demesne. The notion of radical title 
enabled the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure granted by the Crown and to 
become absolute beneficial owner of unalienated land required for the Crown’s purposes. But it is not a 
corollary of the Crown’s acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown 
acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the indigenous inhabitants. 
  See also Samantha Hepburn, ‘Disinterested Truth: Legitimation of the Doctrine of Tenure Post-Mabo’ 
(2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 26. Hepburn notes that native title is more susceptible to 
extinguishment because it has been attached to a feudal land system that is incapable of conferring 
structural equality upon Indigenous and non-Indigenous title. 
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this respect, the doctrine of extinguishment is intricately connected to the 
sovereignty assumptions that underlie the tenure system.P1084F37 
 
C   Constitutional Qualifications to the Doctrine of Extinguishment 
The doctrine of extinguishment is qualified by two significant constitutional 
limitations. First, section 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution provides 
that the Commonwealth Parliament has the power to make laws with respect to 
the acquisition of property on just terms from any state or person for any purpose 
in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws. The just terms 
provision imposes a constitutional obligation on the federal government to pay 
compensation for the taking of property. An extinguishment of native title would 
constitute an acquisition of property for the purposes of section 51(xxxi).P1085F38P This 
obligation has no general application to state parliaments because no equivalent 
provision exists within state constitutions.P1086F39 P The power to extinguish property 
rights is also limited by section 109 of the Constitution. Section 109 has the 
effect that any state legislation which purports to take property is invalid to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth. Where state 
legislation postdates the implementation of the RDA, it may potentially 
extinguish native title rights contrary to the provisions of the RDA and therefore 
be in contravention of section 109 of the Constitution. The RDA, pursuant to 
section 10(1), prevents an extinguishment of native title where it can be shown 
that such extinguishment is discriminatory because it adversely affects the 
enjoyment of native title in a manner that is different to the enjoyment 
experienced by holders who have received their title from the Crown.P1087F40 
A fundamental temporal division in the assessment process for native title 
extinguishment exists as a result of the RDA. Legislation enacted prior to 1975 
and the implementation of the RDA is prima facie valid and any extinguishment 
of native title in this context will depend upon common law assessment 
                                                 
37  See especially Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Tenure, Allodialism and Indigenous Rights at Common Law: 
English, United States and Australian Land Law Compared after Mabo v Queensland’ (1994) 23 Anglo-
American Law Review 397, 427. Edgeworth argues that retaining the doctrine of tenure allowed colonial 
governments to retain ‘political and ideological’ functions. 
38  Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 111 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). Their Honours expressed the view that 
‘any legislative extinguishment of those rights would constitute an expropriation of property, to the 
benefit of the underlying estate, for the purposes of s 51(xxxi)’. See also Sean Brennan, ‘Native Title and 
the “Acquisition of Property” under the Australian Constitution’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law 
Review 28.  
39  For a general discussion on the scope of s 51(xxxi), see Tom Allen, ‘The Acquisition of Property on Just 
Terms’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 351. For a specific discussion of the extension of the just terms 
requirement to the states in the context of native title, see Sean Brennan, ‘Section 51(xxxi) and the 
Acquisition of Property under Commonwealth-State Arrangements: The Relevance to Native Title 
Extinguishment on Just Terms’ (2011) 15(2) Australian Indigenous Law Review 74. 
40  In Mabo v Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186, it was held that the Queensland Coast Islands 
Declaratory Act 1985 (Qld) was invalid because it contravened RDA s 10(1).  
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processes. By contrast, legislation enacted after the RDA, which may be invalid 
as a consequence of section 10(1), is subject to the validating provisions of the 
NTA provided that the exercise of legislative or executive power predates 1 
January 1994, which is the date when the NTA entered into force.P1088F41 
The curtailment of the extinguishment principle by the provisions of the RDA 
was discussed at length by the High Court in the Native Title Act Case.P1089F42P In that 
case, the Western Australian Government enacted the Land (Titles and 
Traditional Usage) Act 1993 (WA) which purported to extinguish native title and 
replace it with statutory rights of traditional usage within a regime prescribed by 
that Act. The Commonwealth, on behalf of the Wororra, Yawuru and Martu 
peoples, argued that the Act was inconsistent with the RDA. The High Court 
concluded that racially discriminatory action, whether legislative or executive, 
which would otherwise have been effective to extinguish native title, is 
ineffective if the action is taken after 31 October 1975, by reason of section 10(1) 
of 15Tthe RDA. 
The High Court examined the impact of the RDA upon the common law 
extinguishment principle and concluded that section 10(1) confers equality of 
enjoyment of the human right to own and inherit property on ‘persons of a 
particular race’. While this section does not alter the characteristics of native title, 
it does confer 
on protected persons rights or immunities which, being recognised by ‘the 
tribunals and all other organs administering justice’, ensure that ‘protected 
persons’ enjoy security in their title to property in the same way that the holders of 
titles granted by the Crown are secure in the enjoyment of their titles. … Security 
in the right to own property necessarily carries with it immunity from arbitrary 
deprivation of the property. P1090F43 
Any state law purporting to authorise an expropriation of property that is 
characteristically held by ‘persons of a particular race’ for purposes additional to 
those that generally justify expropriation, will therefore be contrary to section 
10(1) of the RDA. 
 
D   Validation of Past Acts under the NTA 
The NTA scheme contemplates the existence of legislative or executive acts 
which may affect native title rights and interests by constraint or restriction but 
which do not necessarily extinguish them.P1091F44 P Section 227 of the NTA provides that 
                                                 
41  For an interesting discussion on the intersection between the RDA and native title rights and interests, see 
Kent McNeil, ‘Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title’ (1996) 1 Australian 
Indigenous Law Reporter 181. Legislation postdating the implementation of the RDA may be validated as 
a ‘past act’ or, where it postdates 1 January 1994, but predates 23 December 1996, as an ‘intermediate 
period act’. See generally NTA pt 2 divs 2–2B. 
42  (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
43  Ibid 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (citations omitted). 
44  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 226 [25] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
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an act ‘affects’ native title ‘if it extinguishes the native title rights and interests or 
if it is otherwise wholly or partly inconsistent with their continued existence, 
enjoyment or exercise’. 
Acts categorised as ‘past acts’ under the NTA will only have the effect of 
extinguishing native title completely where they come within the scope of 
category A past acts defined by the NTA.P1092F45P Category A past acts constitute grants 
of freehold estate or a commercial, agricultural, pastoral or residential lease or 
the construction of a public work.P1093F46 P Past acts coming within category B will only 
extinguish native title to the extent of any inconsistency. This means that a 
determination of the level of inconsistency between the rights must be carefully 
ascertained. Category B past acts constitute all leasehold grants, other than a 
mining lease, not already within category A.P1094F47 P Category C past acts constitute 
mining leases and category D past acts constitute all other past acts not otherwise 
coming within categories A to C. Category C and D past acts will not extinguish 
native title. Rather, native title rights and interests are subject to the statutory 
concept known as the non-extinguishment principle.P1095F48 
 
E   The Non-Extinguishment Principle 
The non-extinguishment principle is defined in section 238 of the NTA to 
mean that native title rights and interests will be suspended for the duration of a 
category C or D grant, but may be revived once the grant expires or is 
determined.P1096F49P Section 238 anticipates that an act coming within a category C or D 
past act may be wholly or partially inconsistent with native title rights and 
interests. Where such an inconsistency can be established, section 238 allows 
native title to continue to exist in its entirety even though the rights and interests 
will have no effect, to the extent of the inconsistency, until the grant expires. 
In general terms, the non-extinguishment principle operates to suspend the 
enforcement of native title rights and interests. As outlined by the High Court in 
Ward, the non-extinguishment principle postpones native title rights and interests 
so that even though they may continue to exist, to the extent of any inconsistency 
(which may be entire) with a category C or D act, they will have no effect.P1097F50 P 
Once the past act ‘ceases to operate or its effects are wholly removed’, native 
title rights and interests will be revived. P1098F51 
                                                 
45  NTA ss 15(1)(a)–(b). 
46  NTA ss 229(2)–(4). 
47  NTA ss 15(1)(c), 230. 
48  NTA ss 15(1)(d), 231–2. 
49  NTA s 238. 
50  (2002) 213 CLR 1, 63 [7] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
51  Ibid. 
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The non-extinguishment principle is a pure statutory construct and has no 
common law equivalent.P1099F52P Hence, acts that predate the RDA and do not require 
validation under the NTA have a greater capacity to extinguish native title rights 
and interests in absolute terms. The courts rationalised the non-extinguishment 
principle on the logical proposition that a particular use of a native title right may 
be restricted or prohibited by legislative mandate, without that right or interest 
having to be destroyed.P1100F53P The objective is to align the concept of extinguishment 
with the character of the grant. If the grant only exists for a limited period of 
time, the NTA provides for the statutory ‘revival’ of native title upon its expiry. 
The non-extinguishment principle is an innovative statutory modification of 
the common law process that prevents the undue destruction of native title rights 
and interests by temporary legislative grants. It has no application to 
extinguishment by necessary implication, because the legislation predates the 
RDA and the NTA. Nevertheless, the non-extinguishment principle provides a 
powerful illustration of the capacity of the NTA to fundamentally alter the nature 
and impact of common law extinguishment assumptions. Importing this statutory 
modification into native title extinguishment jurisprudence has instilled a greater 
level of internal resilience to the common law extinguishment principle.P1101F54 
 
F   Interpretive Strategies and Constructive Choices 
Determining the extinguishing effect of a legislative framework that precedes 
the introduction of native title rights and interests represents an interpretative 
quandary. If the drafters of the Act had no conception of native title rights and 
interests at the point of enactment, it is not possible for the textual framework to 
provide any direct clues regarding the intention of the legislature. In such cases, 
the statutory construction process is inevitably speculative and likely to involve 
judicial reflection of a perceived intention rather than a direct assessment of 
explicit parliamentary will.P1102F55 P Assessing how such legislation should deal with 
native title often devolves into an exploratory pathway, influenced by a range of 
                                                 
52  See Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 227 [26] (French CJ and Crennan J). See also Rubibi Community v 
Western Australia (2004) 138 FCR 536.  
53  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 227 [26] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
54  G Nettheim, ‘The Relationship between Native Title and Statutory Title under Land Rights Legislation’ 
in M A Stephenson (ed), Mabo: The Native Title Legislation – A Legislative Response to the High 
Court’s Decision (University of Queensland Press, 1995) 183, 195. 
55  It has been argued that ‘[j]udicial exposition of the meaning of a statutory text is legitimate so long as it is 
an exercise … in discovering the will of Parliament; it is illegitimate when it is an exercise in imposing 
the will of the judge’: Murray Gleeson, ‘The Meaning of Legislation: Context, Purpose and Respect for 
Fundamental Rights’ (2009) 20 Public Law Review 26, 27. See also Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 
CLR 1, 133–4 [315] (Hayne J). His Honour described legislative intention as a ‘metaphor’, which is not 
concerned with the intention (expressed or unexpressed) of those who propounded or drafted the Act, but 
with the reach and operation of the law as ‘ascertained by the conventional processes of statutory 
construction’. 
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exogenous factors, each aimed at assisting courts in determining the appropriate 
interpretative resolution.P1103F56 
Where a wide range of ‘constructional choices’ are available for a court to 
draw upon, the fundamental values encompassed by the native title concept have 
a better chance of being acknowledged and protected.P57P The importance of having 
a range of constructive aids when assessing extinguishment was reinforced by the 
High Court in Akiba, where French CJ and Crennan J held that the identification 
of a statute’s purpose may be achieved ‘by reference to the apparent legal effect 
and operation of the statute, express statements of its objectives and extrinsic 
materials identifying the mischief to which it is directed’.P58P In assessing whether 
legislation is prohibitive or regulatory in nature, relevant factors should include: 
the existence or otherwise of a licensing or permitting regime; the purpose or 
object of the regime; the range of exemptions (if any); and whether the 
implementation of the licensing or permitting regime predates the recognition of 
native title rights, and if so, how the intersection between native title and the 
legislative framework should be managed in light of the NTA objectives.P59 
The prospect of courts incorporating broader external factors in assessing the 
extinguishing effect of pre-RDA and NTA legislation was raised by Finn J in the 
Federal Court decision in Akiba FC.P60 P His Honour held that there was a ‘strong 
presumption’ that ‘Acts be construed, where constructional choices are open,  
so as not to encroach upon common law rights and freedoms’.P 61 P Adopting a 
broader approach to construction was consistent with what Finn J  
described as the ‘contemporary significance now attributed to “context” in  
statutory interpretation’.P62P Presumably ‘constructional’ choices would be ‘open’ 
                                                 
56  For discussion on how purposivists seek to achieve interpretative resolutions, see John F Manning, ‘What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 70, 78. Manning notes that the 
problem is to be tackled from the objective perspective of a ‘hypothetical’ reasonable legislator. See also 
Jonathan T Molot, ‘The Rise and Fall of Textualism’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1. 
57  See Akiba v Queensland [No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, 190–1 [768] (Finn J) (‘Akiba FC’). 
58  (2013) 250 CLR 209, 229 [31]. 
59  For a discussion on the distinction between prohibitive and regulatory legislation generally see Yanner 
(1999) 201 CLR 351, 372 [37] where the Court made clear that ‘regulating the way in which rights and 
interests may be exercised is not inconsistent with their continued existence’ (emphasis in original). 
60  (2010) 204 FCR 1. 
61  Ibid 191 [768], quoting Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 [68] (French, Branson and Stone 
JJ). See especially L Butterly, ‘Clear Choices in Murky Waters: Leo Akiba on Behalf of the Torres Strait 
Regional Seas Claim Group v Commonwealth of Australia’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 237, 242. 
Butterly’s characterisation of the approach of Finn J distinguishes his Honour’s reasoning in this regard 
from that of Keane CJ and Dowsett J in Commonwealth v Akiba (2012) 204 FCR 260, 288 [66] (‘Akiba 
FFC’). 
62  Akiba FC (2010) 204 FCR 1, 191 [770], citing CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 
187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ). In the latter case, the 
extinguishment resulted directly from the legislation itself. See also Newcastle City Council v GIO 
General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85, where McHugh J endorsed a purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation. His Honour argued that it was upheld by s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), 
which explicitly sets out that: 
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in circumstances where, as in Akiba, courts must make prognostic and 
extrapolative assessments about the impact of a pre-native title Act upon native 
title rights and interests. 
Chief Justice Keane and Dowsett J in the Full Federal Court decision in 
Akiba FFC did not agree with the conclusions of Finn J in this regard, arguing 
that to impose a different approach to legislative construction would ‘elevate 
native title above other rights under common law’.P63P On appeal, the High Court 
did not specifically comment on this issue, although the comprehensive approach 
taken in the two joint judgments of French CJ and Crennan J, and of Hayne, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ, to the characterisation of the legislation as ‘non-extinguishing’ 
is indicative of the importance of purposive assessment in this context.P64 P Indeed, 
French CJ and Crennan J specifically noted that ‘purposive construction’ has the 
capacity to take account of the distinction between the ‘exercise of a native title 
right … and the subsistence of that right’.P65 
An extinguishment test that incorporates wider ‘constructional choices’ 
promotes greater structural coherence.P66 P Confirming the validity of this process is 
particularly crucial for the ongoing protection of traditional rights and customs, 
given their heightened exposure to destruction by legislation enacted at a time 
when the existing state of the law was ‘perceived to be the opposite of that which 
it since has been held then to have been’.P67 
Imputative extinguishment of native title should only be justifiable where a 
wide-ranging, purposive statutory construction process ascertains that such a 
consequence was undeniably intended. This evaluation must extend beyond the 
bare detection of ‘legislation which governs or affects the exercise of the right’.P68 P 
The assessment must be sufficiently expansive to allow courts to make a 
proportionate and fair determination on the facts in issue regarding native title 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act a construction that would promote the purpose or object 
underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred 
to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 
  Further, s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) supports the utilisation of extrinsic material in 
the interpretation of an Act.  
63  (2012) 204 FCR 260, 288 [66]. 
64  See Part III(B) of this article for further discussion of the High Court’s decision in Akiba. 
65  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 229 [29]. 
66  See Butterly, above n 61, 246. Butterly notes that ‘clear constructional choices’ led to the logical 
determination by Finn J that the availability of licences to the Islanders in the terms of the legislation 
meant that there was no clear and plain intention to extinguish native title rights. 
67  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 184 (Gummow J). 
68  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 242 [68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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extinguishment.P69P This is particularly important in a context where the absence of 
RDA protection heightens the vulnerability of native title rights to the vicissitudes 
of regulatory incursions. Imputative common law assessment must be guided by 
considerations that enable a court to ascertain ‘with irresistible clearness’P70 P what 
Finn J has described as ‘evidence … to prove the fact and content of the act’.P71 P 
The NTA is an important extra-textual tool in the construction process because it 
outlines the objectives underlying the recognition and protection of native title 
and courts need to be cognisant of these objectives when deciding whether 
legislation should be ‘deemed’ to be extinguishing. P72P A prognostic assessment of 
the extinguishing capacity of a legislative framework is profoundly inequitable if 
it fails to give proportionate consideration to the rationales underlying the 
recognition of the interest it purportedly seeks to destroy. P73 
An orthodox textualist approach to statutory construction will not generally 
permit an interpretation of the legislative intention of one Act to be influenced  
by the policy objectives that underlie another.P74P According to this interpretative 
strategy, the traditional role of statutory interpretation is one of facilitation;  
the courts do not creatively make the law, but rather, implement decisions 
                                                 
69  See also Christopher Walshaw, ‘Interpretation Is Understanding and Application: The Case for 
Concurrent Legal Interpretation’ (2013) 34 Statute Law Review 101. Walshaw argues that statutory 
interpretation cannot be based upon preconceived notions of intention and that meaning should arise from 
the application of legislation to particular facts. 
70  Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J), quoting United States v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 
358, 390 (Marshall CJ) (1805). 
71  Akiba FC (2010) 204 FCR 1, 190 [766]. 
72  See especially Glen Staszewski, ‘Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy’ (2014) 55 William 
and Mary Law Review 221, 296–7. Staszewski argues that statutory interpretation in the modern 
regulatory state is a mechanism that allows courts to use their expertise to implement policy objectives in 
circumstances where the legislation has no discernible intent in relation to specific interpretative 
problems. 
73  See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard University Press, 1982), 37–44. 
Calabresi notes that discretion in statutory interpretation is important to ensure statutes are updated to 
reflect changed circumstances. See also T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Updating Statutory Interpretation’ 
(1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 20, 42. For an Australian perspective, see Gleeson, above n 55.  
74  See Jarrod Shobe, ‘Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting’ 
(2014) 114 Columbia Law Review 807, 858–9. Shobe discusses the fact that a textualist approach refines 
the focus to issues relevant to the Act being evaluated and can be an important tool for clarification. See 
also Bradley C Karkkainen, ‘“Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction’ (1994) 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 401, 409. 
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already determined by an elected legislature.P75 P From this perspective, statutory 
interpretation retains an impeccable ‘democratic pedigree’ because any changes 
to the law must be made in accordance with constitutionally mandated 
lawmaking procedures.P76P Textualists argue that reliance upon textual sources of 
meaning, including the ordinary understanding of statutory provisions and long-
standing canons of construction, is crucial.P77P The underlying purpose and policy 
perspectives of an Act only become relevant where needed to resolve an 
ambiguity that arises when a number of linguistically permissible meanings 
exist. P78 P Textualism lacks a single canonical meaning, and hence is capable of 
ranging in focus from a bare preference for rules over standards to a full and 
‘unwavering adherence to literal meaning’.P79 
On the other hand, legal process theorists, or ‘purposivists’, argue that courts 
should adopt a creative approach.P80 P This can allow a court to consider a statutory 
question based upon what the legislature would have intended if it had 
considered and resolved the problem. Following this strategy, courts should first 
decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the legislation and then determine 
which interpretative strategy will best carry out that purpose. In implementing 
this broad purposivist approach, courts may not give the words a ‘meaning they 
will not bear’ nor can they offend established public policies.P81 P In determining 
what purpose to attribute to a statute, purposivists do pay careful attention to text, 
structure and maxims of construction. However, the purposivist approach tends 
to identify statutory purpose by filtering interpretative sources through an 
objective construct that ‘does not seek actual legislative intent, but rather invokes 
an idealized, hypothetical legislator as the benchmark for understanding what the 
                                                 
75  In Australia, the debate has involved a discussion regarding whether legislative intention should be 
constructed or discovered: see Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 591–2 [43] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), where the High Court suggested that legislative intention 
is a product of statutory interpretation. See also Richard Ekins and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Reality and 
Indispensability of Legislative Intentions’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 39, 41–2. Ekins and 
Goldsworthy reject what they describe as the ‘new sceptical view’ of the High Court, whereby legislative 
intention is constructed. The dichotomy between a textualist and purposive approach remains particularly 
apparent in the United States. For an outline of the textualist methodology, see especially John F 
Manning, ‘Textualism and the Equity of the Statute’ (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 1, 5. 
76  See Staszewski, above n 72, 231. 
77  William N Eskridge Jr, ‘The New Textualism’ (1990) 37 UCLA Law Review 621, 623–4. 
78  See Manning, ‘What Divides Textualists from Purposivists’, above n 56, 84. 
79  Andrew Tutt, ‘Fifty Shades of Textualism’ (2014) 29 Journal of Law and Politics 309, 310. 
80  See Henry M Hart Jr and Albert M Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law (Foundation Press, 1994) 1380. 
81  Ibid 1374. See also Thomas W Merrill, ‘Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983’ (1997) 72 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 1039, 1056–9. Merrill argues that legal process theory was prominent during a period 
when there was significant optimism regarding the capacity of the government to solve problems through 
the use of ‘neutral expertise’: at 1059.  
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legislation means’.P82P The process of identifying statutory purpose was outlined by 
the joint judgment in Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) as follows: 
The application of the rules will properly involve the identification of a statutory 
purpose, which may appear from an express statement in the relevant statute, by 
inference from its terms and by appropriate reference to extrinsic materials. The 
purpose of a statute is not something which exists outside the statute. It resides in 
its text and structure, albeit it may be identified by reference to common law and 
statutory rules of construction.P83 
Law is an interpretative enterprise and strategies are always able to be 
manipulated, given that strategies may be derived from different standpoints that 
can include historical and political context as well as constitutional 
perspectives.P84 P Determining an appropriate strategic framework is particularly 
important when legislative intent is illusory and courts are, in truth, exercising 
policy-making discretion. P 85 P The common law extinguishment of native title 
should not occur purely on the basis of a textualist interpretation. The problem 
does not reside in legislative ambiguity, but rather, chronological adjustment. 
The text of the Act in issue may be perfectly clear in its intent, however the 
altered landscape, post-native title, requires the intent to be revised. As argued by 
Calabresi, judges should be entitled to rework legislative enactments, to keep 
them in line with the current social and legal landscape. This is no more than the 
courts are already doing, albeit by subterfuge. P86 
Revisionist strategies are nothing new for native title jurisprudence, which 
has always been characterised by a spectral presence and a plurality of process.P87 P  
The recognition and enforcement of native title is heavily dependent  
upon unconventional and irregular adaptations.P88P Incorporating native title into a 
preconceived Australian land framework is itself the product of a revised feudal 
imagery. P89 P Hence, the capacity of the common law to ‘provide the tools for a 
series of artificial and purely formal reconciliations of law, politics and history’ 
                                                 
82  Manning, ‘What Divides Textualists from Purposivists’, above n 56, 85–6. 
83  (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 [44] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
84  See Nicholas Bagley, ‘The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability’ (2014) 127 Harvard Law Review 
1285, 1331. See also Suzanne Corcoran, ‘Theories of Statutory Interpretation’ in Suzanne Corcoran and 
Stephen Bottomley (eds), Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press, 2005) 1; Jane S Schacter, 
‘Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation’ (1995) 108 Harvard 
Law Review 593. 
85  See Staszewski, above n 72. 
86  Calabresi, above n 73, 2. 
87  See Peter Rush, ‘An Altered Jurisdiction: Corporeal Traces of Law’ (1997) 6 Griffith Law Review 144, 
156. 
88  See especially Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, ‘Conduct of Laws: Native Title, Responsibility 
and Some Limits of Jurisdictional Thinking’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 470, 476. 
Dorsett and McVeigh note that it is the ‘forms of jurisdictional arrangement that give us repertoires of 
lawful engagement’: at 479. 
89  See Hepburn, ‘Feudal Tenure and Native Title’, above n 35. 
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has always been the means by which the success of native title jurisprudence is 
measured.P90 
The interpretative strategies that inform the extinguishment process must be 
flexible enough to ensure that native title is not relegated from its status as a 
‘perception of socially constituted fact’ to a ‘perception’ of fleeting illusion.P91 P 
Statutory interpretation is apposite to the common law doctrine of 
extinguishment and plays a crucial role in preventing native title from becoming 
a ‘constraining force that works against the interests of Indigenous peoples and 
against the development of a just and inclusive law’.P92P A purposivist approach is 
optimum because the exclusivity that textualism attracts prevents words in a 
statute from being properly supplemented by a full and comprehensive 
understanding of a fundamentally altered context.P93 P A purposive approach also 
reinforces the ability of native title to function as the normative interface between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous law.P94 
It is arguable that one of the core canons of construction, the principle of 
legality, supports a purposivist approach to common law extinguishment. This 
principle requires courts to impute an intention to abrogate fundamental common 
law rights only in circumstances where a clear and unambiguous legislative 
purpose can be established.P 95 P Courts must be guided by the paradigmatic 
assumption that core common law rights are so ‘deep-lying in our legal order’ 
that it is ‘improbable’ that the legislature would overthrow them in the absence of 
‘irresistible’ clarity.P96P Legislative intention is, however, a mercurial notion and 
the principle of legality is merely a tool of construction.P97 P Where the legislation in 
issue precedes the reception of common law rights, a literal intention to destroy 
native title cannot be established. A predictive, ‘technocratic’ interpretation of 
                                                 
90  Gerry Simpson, ‘Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved 
Jurisprudence’ (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 195, 200.  
91  The reference to a ‘socially constituted fact’ is adapted from Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The 
Idea of Property in Land’ in Susan Bright and John Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 15, 27. 
92  Strelein, above n 5, 97. 
93  See Molot, above n 56, 48. Molot notes that aggressive textualists tend ‘to see legislation as words 
written on a piece of paper’.  
94  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 439 [31] (Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), quoting Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96, 128 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). In Fejo, the majority held that native title is ‘an intersection 
of traditional laws and customs with the common law. The underlying existence of the traditional laws 
and customs is a necessary pre-requisite for native title but their existence is not a sufficient basis for 
recognising native title’ (emphasis in original). 
95  For an outline of the principle of legality, see especially Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of 
Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 449, 452. Meagher notes that 
there is ‘nothing particularly new about judges construing statutes and deploying their interpretive powers 
more broadly to protect rights’. 
96  Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J), quoted in ibid 459. 
97  See Ekins and Goldsworthy, above n 75, 44. Ekins and Goldsworthy note that the principle of legality has 
evolved from a ‘genuine presumption of legislative intent’ to a ‘constitutional principle’. 
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what the drafters may have intended is possible, however, this analysis cannot 
justify abrogation according to the core tenets of the principle. P98 P Within this 
context, guidance from inter-contextual reference points becomes crucial.P99 
The principle of legality extends beyond the parameters of a defined, textual 
space where such augmentation is necessary to support an appropriate 
interpretational solution.P100P This coheres with the ‘normative refinement’ of the 
principle of legality, which reconfigures its operative dimensions to something 
akin to a constitutional right. According to this perspective, courts should be 
actively seeking to attribute a legislative intention that prevents the abrogation of 
rights, because such a construction improves the ‘mechanisms of political 
accountability’ that form the foundation of our system of representative and 
responsible government.P101 
 
G   Section 211 and Constructional Choices 
Section 211 of the NTA prevents personal, non-commercial native title rights 
and interests from having to comply with licensing and permitting requirements. 
Section 211(2) stipulates that native title rights and interests which are regulated 
or prohibited by legislation will not be subject to these restrictions where it can 
be shown that the native title activity has been carried out for the purpose of 
satisfying personal, domestic or non-commercial activities. 
The preconditions to the application of section 211(2) are specified in section 
211(1) of the NTA. They include a requirement that the relevant law of the 
Commonwealth, state or territory prohibits or restricts persons from carrying on 
the class of activity other than in accordance with a licence, permit or other 
instrument granted or issued under the law; and that the licence, permit or 
instrument is not granted purely for research, environmental protection, public 
health or public safety purposes. 
In its defensive capacity, section 211 only applies to non-extinguished native 
title rights and interests. As outlined by Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Akiba, 
‘[s]ection 211 can only be engaged if relevant native title rights and interests 
continue to exist’.P102P Section 211 provides crucial support in this context because 
it helps to ease the inevitable collision between usufructuary entitlements that 
uphold traditional rights and interests and regulatory provisions that qualify or 
impede the full acknowledgement of those rights. In this sense, section 211 has 
an exclusionary operation because, in the words of the High Court in the Native 
                                                 
98  See Brennan, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Indigenous Property Rights’, above n 28, 258. 
99  See Ekins and Goldsworthy, above n 75, 43. Ekins and Goldsworthy note that ‘clarification of a statute’s 
meaning requires taking into account all admissible evidence of legislative intention’.  
100  See Brendan Lim, ‘The Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law 
Review 372, 374–5. 
101  Ibid 389 ff, where Lim discusses the normative refinement of the principle of legality. See also: at 408. 
102  (2013) 250 CLR 209, 243 [71]. 
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Title Act Case, its effect ‘is not to control the exercise of State legislative power, 
but to exclude laws made in exercise of that power (inter alia) from affecting the 
freedom of native title holders to enjoy the usufructuary rights’.P103P Without such 
protection, the normative value of native title rights and interests is threatened 
and practical reconciliation processes are endangered.P104 
Section 211 also provides instructive guidance for courts attempting to 
determine whether an Act that includes such a licensing or permitting regime 
should be characterised as extinguishing native title rights or interests. 
Legislation predating the RDA and the NTA is less likely to be inconsistent with 
native title where it contains a licensing or permitting regime because such a 
framework is characterised by a ‘regulatory’ rather than ‘prohibitive’ focus. P105 P 
The operative scope of section 211 of the NTA inevitably influences this process. 
Assessing whether native title has been extinguished by legislation is 
fundamentally different to determining whether native title rights and interests 
must comply with licensing or permitting requirements. There is, however, an 
underlying connection between the two. The core policy of the NTA to immunise 
non-commercial, domestic native title rights against regulatory infringement 
provides important inter-contextual guidance for determining whether an Act 
extinguishes native title in the first place. 
Only native title rights and interests that have not been extinguished may 
raise the defence in section 211 of the NTA, and native title rights and interests 
are unlikely to be extinguished if the legislative framework incorporates a 
licensing regime. In this respect, section 211, like the soft statutory concept of the 
‘non-extinguishment’ principle, helps to moderate the ‘seamless violence’ of a 
common law that retains the means to disentitle, exclude and extinguish native 
title rights and interests.P106P In this way, section 211 may function in a manner akin 
to the constitutional protections conferred upon Aboriginal title by section 35(1) 
of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982.P107 
                                                 
103  (1995) 183 CLR 373, 474 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
104  See especially Victoria Freeman, ‘In Defence of Reconciliation’ (2014) 27 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 213, 216. Freeman argues that reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people is a ‘multi-faceted’ concept that centres around the ‘ongoing process of building the relationships, 
alliances and social understandings that are necessary to support the systemic changes that are true 
decolonization’. 
105  This distinction has been explored in a number of cases: Melbourne Corporation v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 
174, 188–90 (Isaacs J); Williams v Melbourne Corporation (1933) 49 CLR 142, 148–9 (Starke J); 
Brunswick Corporation v Stewart (1941) 65 CLR 88, 93–4 (Rich ACJ), 95 (Starke J); Toronto Municipal 
Corporation v Virgo [1896] AC 88, 93–4 (Lord Davey). 
106  See especially Katherine Biber, ‘Being/Nothing: Native Title and Fantasy Fulfilment’ (2004) 3 
Indigenous Law Journal 1, 6. 
107  The application and scope of s 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 in Canada was outlined in Sparrow v 
The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 1075. For an excellent discussion on the reconciliation functions of s 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act 1982 in Canada, see Constance MacIntosh, ‘Tsilhqot’in Nation v BC: Reconfiguring 
Aboriginal Title in the Name of Reconciliation’ (2014) 47 University of British Columbia Law Review 
167, 204–8. 
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III   RELEVANT CASES 
A   Yanner 
Yanner was the first Australian decision to clearly articulate the distinction 
between regulatory and prohibitive legislation in the context of an imputative 
extinguishment by legislation predating the RDA and the NTA.P108P The decision 
illustrates a preference in such circumstances for a broader thematic evaluation of 
the legislative framework. 
The facts of Yanner raised the potential extinguishment of native title rights 
to hunt and fish through the operation of inconsistent regulation in the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld).P109P Section 54(1)(a) of the Fauna Conservation Act 
1974 (Qld) set out that a person should not take or keep fauna of any kind unless 
a licence or permit is granted in accordance with the Act. The appellant, Yanner, 
was charged in the Queensland Magistrates Court with taking fauna without a 
licence contrary to the provisions of the Act. The appellant argued that he was 
entitled to hunt for fresh water crocodile in the absence of a specific permit as he 
was exercising native title rights that were upheld by the operation of section 211 
of the NTA. This argument was supported at first instance. 
On appeal, the High Court confirmed this and held that the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) was not inconsistent with the exercise of rights to 
hunt and fish because it had a regulatory rather than a prohibitive character. 
Further, section 211 precluded any need for the non-extinguished native title 
rights of the appellant to comply with licencing or permitting requirements. 
In reaching this determination, the High Court adopted a wide-ranging 
approach to the statutory construction of the vesting provision in the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). The Court argued that the vesting of fauna as 
‘property’ was not inconsistent with the exercise of native title rights and 
interests. Two core grounds were articulated. First, the Court argued that the 
reference to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ within the legislation comprehended a 
wide variety of different meanings and did not necessarily indicate a beneficial 
ownership that would prohibit any recognition of native title. In reaching this 
conclusion the Court drew upon a diverse array of textual and non-textual 
materials. Secondly, the Court argued that a diminished construct of ‘property’ 
was not necessarily inconsistent with the continued recognition of native title 
rights and interests. 
                                                 
108  (1999) 201 CLR 351, 372 [37] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). This distinction was also 
raised by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1097–9 (Dickson 
CJ and La Forest J), where the discretionary conferral of fishing permits was found to amount to a 
regulation rather than an extinguishment of Aboriginal title. The distinction between regulatory and 
prohibitory acts was also referred to by Brennan J in Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 64, where his 
Honour noted that a ‘clear and plain intention to extinguish native title is not revealed by a law which 
merely regulates the enjoyment of native title’. 
109  (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 [40] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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The breadth and scope of the concept of ‘fauna’ made it difficult to identify 
exactly what ‘fauna’ the Crown actually owned. For example, did ‘fauna’ include 
everything located within the boundaries of the territory, or did it include that 
which merely passed through the boundaries? P 110 P Further, even if the subject 
matter could be reasonably identified, it was unclear exactly what ownership of a 
wild animal meant. Under common law, wild animals were only the subject of 
limited ownership rights, and the Court concluded that it was unlikely the 
legislature intended to override this established orthodoxy.P111 P There was also a 
clear historical connection between vesting of fauna as property and the creation 
of an early royalty system. This provided a strong incentive for the inclusion of a 
vesting provision in the first iteration of the Act, but was not relevant in a 
contemporary framework, where a royalty system is not operative.P112 
The High Court concluded that the statutory vesting provision did not confer 
full beneficial title in fauna upon the Crown. Rather, the vesting provision had 
little relevance other than to function as ‘a fiction expressive in legal shorthand 
of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate 
the exploitation of an important resource’.P113 
This conclusion supported the second ground, which was that the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) did not extinguish native title because it was 
‘regulatory’ in character and therefore not inconsistent with the continued 
recognition of native title. The Court held that the imposition of compliance 
obligations did not ‘deny the continued exercise of the rights and interests that 
Aboriginal law and custom recognises them as possessing’.P114P According to the 
Court, this was because a regulatory Act seeks to regulate the exercise of native 
title rights and interests without extinguishing those rights or interests.P 115 P A 
regulatory Act differs fundamentally from a prohibitive Act. Regulating the way 
in which a right may be exercised ‘presupposes that the right exists’.P116 
Section 211 of the NTA was also relevant to the characterisation process. 
Chief Justice Gleeson, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ noted that section 211 
provides guidance because of its underlying assumption that a conditional 
                                                 
110  Ibid 367 [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
111  See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cavendish Publishing, first published 
1765–9, 2001 ed) vol 2, 11–12 [14], 318–21 [391]–[395], where the common law approach is that ‘wild 
animals’ prior to being ‘seized’ remain ‘ferae naturae’. 
112  ‘[T]he drafter of the early Queensland fauna legislation may well have seen it as desirable (if not 
positively essential) to provide for the vesting of some property in fauna in the Crown as a necessary step 
in creating a royalty system’: Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 369 [27] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ). 
113  Ibid 369 [28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ), quoting Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 402 
(Vinson CJ) (1948).  
114  Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
115  Ibid. 
116  Ibid 372 [37] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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prohibition does not affect the existence of native title rights and interests.P117 P 
Section 211 indicates that the mere existence of regulatory conditions and 
prohibitions do not deny the presence of native title and are better regarded as 
indicative of a broader regulatory intent. 
 
B   Akiba 
The conclusions of Yanner were followed by the High Court in Akiba, where 
the connection between the extinguishment process and the application of section 
211 was even clearer. The facts of Akiba concerned the right of Indigenous 
inhabitants to take fish for commercial purposes in particular areas of the Torres 
Strait. The issue before the Court was whether the Commonwealth and 
Queensland fisheries legislation prohibited the exercise of native title rights to 
fish for commercial purposes or whether the legislation was purely regulatory. 
The primary judge, Finn J, held that a native title right to access and take 
resources for any purpose in the native title area did exist and that this right 
included taking fish for commercial or trading purposes. Justice Finn 
characterised the legislation in issue as regulatory rather than prohibitory because 
the Acts did not seek to deny the fishing rights of Indigenous inhabitants for 
commercial purposes.P118P His Honour reached this conclusion by adopting a broad 
‘constructional choices’ approach to statutory interpretation. 
The Full Federal Court, by majority (Keane CJ and Dowsett J, Mansfield J 
dissenting), allowed an appeal against the decision of the primary judge. The 
majority held that successive fisheries legislation in Queensland and legislation 
enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament did extinguish native title rights to 
take fish and other aquatic life for commercial purposes because it was 
prohibitive in character.P 119 P15T Chief Justice Keane and Dowsett J distinguished 
Yanner from the facts in Akiba on the basis that the decision in Yanner turned 
upon the operation and availability of section 211 rather than any general 
characterisation process and therefore had no direct relevance to the facts in 
issue.15TP120 
15T he High Court overturned the conclusions of the Full Federal Court and 
held that the relevant Commonwealth and Queensland fisheries legislation did 
not extinguish native title because the Acts were regulatory, not prohibitive. 
Chief Justice French and Crennan J held that extinguishment was not a ‘logical 
necessity’ in circumstances where 15Tstatutory prohibitions against the taking of  
fish and aquatic life existed.P121 P Rejecting this notion was, their Honours felt, 
‘consistent with the maintenance of a proper distinction between proprietary or 
                                                 
117  Ibid 374 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
118  Akiba FC (2010) 204 FCR 1, 212 [851].  
119  See especially Akiba FFC (2012) 204 FCR 260, 295–6 [84]–[87] (Keane CJ and Dowsett J). 
120  Ibid 293–4 [79]–[80]. 
121  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 232–3 [39]. 
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usufructuary rights and their exercise in particular ways or for particular 
purposes’. P122 P A law that affects the exercise of a native title right only when 
undertaken for a particular purpose or by a particular means should not be treated 
as presumptively inconsistent with native title, particularly where the law may be 
construed as doing little more than that.P123P Their Honours held that the clear and 
plain intention of the legislation was to regulate the way in which licences were 
issued and not to impose a blanket prohibition upon exercising rights to fish.P124 
Justices Hayne, Kiefel and Bell came to the same conclusion, although they 
relied more extensively upon NTA provisions in the statutory construction 
process. Their Honours made it clear that questions ‘about extinguishment of 
native title rights and interests cannot be answered without beginning in the 
relevant provisions of the NTA’.P125P Their Honours disagreed with the approach of 
the Full Federal Court, holding that extinguishment by necessary implication 
depends upon establishing inconsistency and this is achieved by assessing the 
identity of the Act in issue, not by ‘observing only that there is legislation which 
governs or affects the exercise of the right’.P126 
Further, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ argued that the central point underlying 
these cases is that a statutory prohibition on taking resources from land or waters 
without a licence does not conclusively establish that native title rights to access, 
remain in, use or remove resources have been extinguished. Regulating native 
title is not, and should not be regarded as, inconsistent with its continued 
existence. Section 211 reinforces this primary assumption and upholds the 
fundamental ratio of Yanner that ‘[r]egulating particular aspects of the 
usufructuary relationship with traditional land does not sever the connection of 
the Aboriginal peoples concerned with the land’.P127 
 
C   Karpany 
The scope and application of the NTA were further reviewed by the High 
Court in Karpany. In that case, the whole Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) concluded that the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA), 
which was introduced prior to the implementation of the RDA and therefore 
unaffected by it, did not extinguish native title rights and interests despite 
implementing a licensing regime that strictly regulated fishing within the areas 
covered by the native title rights. 
                                                 
122  Ibid. 
123  See, eg, ibid 224 [21] (French CJ and Crennan J). 
124  See also Butterly, above n 61, 247. Butterly notes that ‘[r]egulation does not evince a clear and plain 
intention to extinguish; therefore there is no need to go on to consider inconsistency’. 
125  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 237 [54]. 
126  Ibid 242 [68]. 
127  Ibid 240 [63], quoting Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ). 
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The facts of Karpany concerned members of the Narrunga people who had 
successfully defended a summary prosecution under the Fisheries Management 
Act 2007 (SA) for having in their possession a quantity of undersized abalone. 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia rejected the assumption 
that the right to obtain abalone was a product of subsisting native title rights and 
interests.P128P That Court held, by majority, that the relevant native title rights that 
would have authorised the taking of undersized abalone were extinguished by the 
Fisheries Act 1971 (SA).P129 
On appeal, the High Court concluded that the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) did 
not extinguish any native title right to take abalone. Their Honours adopted a 
purposive evaluation of the legislation and, consistently with Yanner and Akiba, 
concluded that the Act was regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature. The 
framework of the Act evinced a legislative intention to control the way in which 
fishing was conducted rather than to prohibit fishing per se. As such, the 
legislative regime could not ‘be said to have been inconsistent with the 
recognition by the common law of those rights’.P130 
A number of factors influenced this determination. First, the framework of 
the Act expressly permitted a person who did not hold a licence to take fish by 
‘certain means’ and ‘otherwise than for the purpose of sale’. Further, the 
Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) conferred upon the Minister power to grant any person a 
special permit to take fish and this was capable of being ‘administered 
consistently with the continuing exercise of native title rights’.P131 
Finally, section 211(2) of the NTA applied to the unextinguished native title 
rights because the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) came within the scope 
of the defence. This meant that when the Narrunga people gathered abalone for 
their own non-commercial, domestic purposes, they were not to be subject to the 
permitting requirements in the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA). 
The connectivity between the extinguishment assessment and the application 
of the section 211 defence was very clear in Karpany. Both focused upon the 
‘regulatory’ character of the legislation in issue. The extinguishment assessment 
determined whether the legislation was consistent with the continued recognition 
of native title rights and interests. The defence provision protected usufructuary 
native title rights, in certain circumstances, against regulatory incursion. The 
extinguishment assessment and defence provision shared the same goal: to 
determine how regulation should affect the ongoing exercise and recognition of 
native title rights and interests. This mutuality in focus provided a firm basis for 
collaborative extrapolation in the extinguishment assessment. 
 
                                                 
128  Dietman v Karpany (2012) 112 SASR 514. 
129  Ibid 524–5 [35]–[36] (Gray J), 525 [38] (Kelly J). 
130  Karpany (2013) 303 ALR 216, 224 [32] (The Court). 
131  Ibid. 
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D   Summary 
The conclusions of the High Court in Yanner, Akiba and Karpany suggest a 
clear pattern that favours an expansive and purposive approach to statutory 
construction in the context of extinguishment by necessary implication. This 
process will usually involve referencing the provisions of the NTA, particularly 
section 211. The decisions indicate that the High Court is increasingly conscious 
of the impossibility of deeming extinguishment purely on the basis of a direct 
textual analysis of the statutory provisions of an Act that predates the recognition 
of usufructuary native title rights and interests. The preference for a purposive 
interpretative strategy in this context coheres with logic and proportionality, and 
also corresponds with longer-term reconciliation objectives. 
 
IV   COMPARISONS WITH CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
A broad purposive approach to the construction of extinguishment by 
necessary implication reinforces longer-term reconciliation objectives by 
ensuring that native title is more effectively fortified against unfair regulatory 
incursions.P132 P In Canada, the reconciliation responsibilities that flow from the 
constitutionalisation of Aboriginal rights are wide-ranging and include shielding 
native title from extinguishment or infringement by regulatory regimes and 
prioritising the exercise of non-commercial native title rights in resources.P133P In 
Australia, no such constitutional protection exists. Within such an environment, 
the relevance of statutory interpretation is heightened. A purposive approach to 
the construction of legislation with the potential to extinguish native title is 
crucial because it acknowledges the fact that statutory language is not, in itself, 
always dispositive. Assessing a range of inter-temporal ‘constructional choices’ 
allows broader public policy objectives to be assimilated.P134 
                                                 
132  See generally Dwight G Newman and Danielle Schweitzer, ‘Between Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of 
Law: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia’ (2008) 41 University of British Columbia Law Review 249, 
276. Newman and Schweitzer note that reconciliation is fundamentally concerned with the meaningful 
challenge of determining how ‘we are all going to live together’. 
133  Ibid 261. 
134  This is particularly crucial when dealing with the modern statutory concept of native title. See William L 
Twining and David Miers, How To Do Things with Rules (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 11, 
quoting Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2009) 301–2. Raz 
notes that statutory interpretation may be innovative in the way in which it approaches meaning. 
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Australian courts are cognisant of the importance of protecting fundamental 
civil and human rights when approaching questions of statutory construction.P135 P 
This is particularly true for the doctrine of extinguishment where the impact of 
characterising a statutory framework as prohibitive and inconsistent has the 
potential to result in a complete legal termination of traditional rights and 
interests. A purposivist approach to statutory construction that takes account of 
‘extra statutory and unenacted contextual clues’, and which has access to an 
extensive array of instructive, multicultural reference points, provides optimum 
protection in this context given the absence of specific constitutional 
safeguards.P136 
In Canada, the burgeoning reconciliation jurisprudence is a direct product of 
the specific constitutional protection afforded to Aboriginal rights pursuant to 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982.P137P Section 35(1) imposes an obligation 
to reconcile the federal duty to recognise and affirm Aboriginal rights with the 
sovereign power of the government to exercise federal legislative power.P138 P The 
reconciliation imperative flows from the ‘Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over 
an Aboriginal people and the de facto control of land and resources that were 
formerly in the control of that people’.P139 
In Sparrow v The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed section 
35(1) and concluded that while regulation affecting Aboriginal rights is not 
precluded by the section, all such regulation must be enacted according to a valid 
                                                 
135  See Michael Kirby, ‘Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 113, 115. See also Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32(1); 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 30. See also Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 23–4. Ekins outlines the importance of legislation in changing the law, and 
suggests that positive law provides the foundation for judicial action, even where the text itself is not 
determinate. 
136  See John F Manning, ‘What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?’, above n 56, 99. Manning discusses 
the fact that purposivists focus upon the underlying policy context whereas textualism is concerned with 
semantic import. See also Lim, above n 100, 392. Lim outlines the underlying values that the ‘refined’ 
principle of legality addresses. 
137  For a discussion of the reconciliation jurisprudence, see Kent McNeil, ‘Reconciliation and the Supreme 
Court: The Opposing Views of Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin’ (2003) 2 Indigenous Law Journal 1; 
Newman and Schweitzer, above n 132; Kent McNeil, ‘Reconciliation and Third-Party Interests: 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia’ (2010) 8 Indigenous Law Journal 7. 
138  See Nikal v The Queen [1996] 1 SCR 1013, where the Supreme Court of Canada examined a range of 
‘reconciliation’ obligations that flowed from section 35(1). These included the following obligations:  
whether there had been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a 
situation of expropriation, fair compensation was available, and whether the aboriginal group in question 
had been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented.  
  at 1064 [109] (Cory J), quoting Sparrow v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1119 (Dickson CJ and La 
Forest J). 
139  Minister of Forests (British Columbia) v Haida Nation [2004] 3 SCR 511, 528 [32] (McLachlin CJ) 
(emphasis in original). Her Honour concluded that the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing with 
Aboriginal peoples means that broader approaches to the assessment of Aboriginal title are imperative if 
reconciliation objectives are to be promoted. 
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objective which promotes the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights. 
Chief Justice Dixon and La Forest J in Sparrow v The Queen stated: 
By giving aboriginal rights constitutional status and priority, Parliament and the 
provinces have sanctioned challenges to social and economic policy objectives 
embodied in legislation to the extent that aboriginal rights are affected. Implicit in 
this constitutional scheme is the obligation of the legislature to satisfy the test of 
justification. The way in which a legislative objective is to be attained must 
uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique 
contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown 
and Canada’s aboriginal peoples. The extent of legislative or regulatory impact on 
an existing aboriginal right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and 
affirmation. P140 
While section 35(1) does not ‘promise immunity’ from government 
regulation, it does require the government to at least bear the burden of justifying 
any legislation which negatively affects any Aboriginal right protected under 
section 35(1). The focus of the Canadian courts has been to incorporate what has 
become known as the ‘reconciliation theory’ into broader Aboriginal 
jurisprudence to ensure that the exercise of sovereign power and its effect upon 
Aboriginal rights properly ‘accords with Canada’s identity as a constitutional 
democracy’.P141P This does not mean that the Crown has no capacity to regulate 
Aboriginal rights but rather, as Delgamuukw v British Columbia affirmed, that 
such regulation needs to be of ‘sufficient importance to the broader community 
as a whole’.P142 
The rigor with which the Canadian courts evaluate the legitimacy of 
regulatory incursions upon Aboriginal title is clearly manifest in the most recent 
landmark Canadian case on the issue, Tsilhqot’in. P 143 P The facts of Tsilhqot’in 
raised the issue of whether the Forest Act, RSBCP P1996, c 157 (‘Forest Act’) 
applied to regulate Aboriginal title and diminish the scope of those rights or 
whether its application offended section 35(1). At issue was approximately 1700 
square kilometres of land in British Columbia. The Forest Act made clear that the 
Crown was only capable of issuing timber licences with respect to ‘Crown 
timber’, which is timber located specifically on Crown land.P144 P The Crown was 
not empowered under the Act to issue timber licences over ‘private land’, which 
is defined as any land that is not Crown land. The Act was, however, silent on the 
issue of whether timber licences could be issued over Aboriginal title land. This 
generated a number of possible interpretations for the Court: (i) Aboriginal title 
                                                 
140  Sparrow v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1110 (Dickson CJ and La Forest J). 
141  Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia [2007] BCJ No 2465, [1350] (Vickers J). 
142  [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1108 [161] (Lamer CJ, Cory and Major JJ), quoting Gladstone v The Queen [1996] 2 
SCR 723, 774–5 [73] (Lamer CJ, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ).  
143  [2014] 2 SCR 256. 
144  Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157, s 1 (definition of ‘Crown land’), referring to Land Act, RSBC 1996, c 
245, s 1 (definition of ‘Crown land’). 
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land is ‘Crown land’; (ii) Aboriginal title land is ‘private land’; and (iii) the 
Forest Act does not apply to Aboriginal title land at all. 
This raised the further issue as to whether the legislature intended the vast 
areas of the province, all of which were potentially subject to Aboriginal title, to 
be immune from forestry regulation. If the Court did hold that the Act had an 
application to Aboriginal title, the question would be whether the conferral of a 
regulatory power on the Crown to issue timber licences to third parties, and the 
failure to consult with the Tsilhqot’in people in the issuance of such licences, 
infringed the core reconciliation requirements articulated in section 35(1). 
The Supreme Court held that the Forest Act intended the land to be regulated, 
as either Crown land or private land, up until the point when a determination 
regarding Aboriginal title was made, either by agreement or court order. Once 
land was acknowledged as being subject to Aboriginal title, the Forest Act 
became inapplicable, although it remained open to the legislature to amend the 
Act to apply to Aboriginal land, provided any such amendment remained in 
accordance with section 35(1). 
The Court further held that the issuance of timber licences by the Crown, 
without consultation with the Tsilhqot’in people, amounted to an infringement of 
section 35(1). The Court noted that section 35(1) would be infringed by 
unreasonable regulation that imposed undue hardship, or denied the holders of 
the right their preferred means of exercising the right. General forestry legislation 
would not ordinarily constitute an infringement, however, on the facts, the 
issuance of timber licences on Aboriginal title land in the absence of any 
consultation produced a ‘direct transfer of Aboriginal property rights to a third 
party’.P145P The Supreme Court found that this constituted a ‘serious infringement’ 
that could not be justified purely on the grounds that the issuance of such licences 
would generate economic benefits for the tenure holders.P146 
Tsilhqot’in highlights what is achievable in a jurisdiction where 
constitutional protection has generated strong reconciliation obligations. The 
absence of equivalent constitutional protection in Australia means that native title 
has a heightened exposure to the vicissitudes of regulatory incursion. This is 
particularly manifest through the vulnerability of native title to extinguishment 
by necessary implication. Australian courts must therefore ensure that the core 
values underpinning the ongoing recognition and protection of native title rights 
and interests are facilitated through a more effective usage of available 
constructional tools. The unique history, demands and opportunities of each 
extinguishment determination must be unequivocally justified. This is difficult 
                                                 
145  Tsilhqot’in [2014] 2 SCR 256, 120 [124] (McLachlin CJ, LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, 
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ). 
146  Ibid 122 [127] (McLachlin CJ, LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and 
Wagner JJ). 
616 UNSW Law Journal Volume 38(2) 
where legislative intention is construed without reference to the underlying 
principles that informed the reception of native title.P147 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The High Court of Australia has made it clear that considerations of context 
and purpose may require words contained within legislation to be read ‘in a way 
that does not directly correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning’.P148P A 
purposive construction is axiomatic for determining the legislative intentions of 
Acts which predate the recognition of native title and which may be found to 
extinguish that title. While context is not ‘some kind of free-floating resource 
that can be appropriated for any theoretical purpose’, where the information is 
relevant to the contemporary application of the Act, it is reasonable for courts to 
rely upon it for the purposes of achieving a balanced statutory construction.P149 P 
The presumption against destroying common law rights in the absence of clear 
and unequivocal legislative intention means that any indicative evaluation of the 
extinguishing impact of a pre-RDA and NTA Act needs to be carefully balanced 
and informed. The process should take account of the policy objectives 
underlying the implementation of native title rights and interests, and reconcile 
these objectives, where possible, with the purpose and intent of the legislation in 
issue. 
Native title in Australia has always been a tentative concept. Its existence is 
subject to the relatively unconstrained application of the sovereignty assumptions 
that underlie an inherited British constitutional framework. To protect the 
traditional usufructuary rights that are incorporated within the concept of native 
title against the disentitling effects of this background, extinguishment by 
necessary implication requires a broad but structured interpretative strategy. 
Native title rights and interests should not be extinguished unless a clear and 
plain statutory intention can be established. A clear and plain intention will not 
be shown unless, in accordance with a purposive construction, it is apparent that 
the explicit framework of the Act, the objectives of the NTA, the instructional 
insights of section 211 and any further relevant interpretative aids, indisputably 
indicate that native title cannot coexist with the regulatory framework. A positive 
extinguishment should not occur in the absence of rigorous purposive 
construction, given the profound consequences of such a legal cessation. 
                                                 
147  See, eg, Tsilhqot’in Nation, ‘Appellant’s Factum’, Submission in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 
File No 34986, 30 May 2013, 78 [293] ff.  
148  Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] (McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
149  Ekins and Goldsworthy, above n 75, 58.  
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This process may not be formally consistent with stricter, textualist 
approaches to statutory interpretation. However, the underlying importance of 
protecting native title against undue and unfair regulatory destruction and of 
reinforcing core values that transcend the boundaries of constitutional protection 
in Australia justifies such deviation. Textualism is simply incapable of providing 
an effective response to the inherent limitations on legislative foresight. The most 
effective and utilised interpretative strategy in this context is a broad purposivist 
approach which introduces an expansive range of ‘constructional choices’ for 
courts, as this strategy remains faithful to the normative progression of robust 
reconciliation goals for Indigenous communities. 
 
 
